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ABSTRACT: 
 
The main focus of this project is investigating and exploring the impact of outsourcing on one 
of the most iconic Danish companies (LEGO), which attracted our attention during the 
preparation of this project. We decided to focus on a single case study, because we felt that 
dividing our efforts by investigating more than one company, would not allow us to focus in 
sufficient detail on the domino effects that outsourcing can have on a singular institution. The 
main question of this project is “How could LEGO improve the Make-or-buy- decision and 
the relationship management when it comes to outsourcing”?  
 
In order to answer the main question, we must consider two sub-questions stemming from the 
main issue, namely: “How could LEGO improve the decision-making-process to outsource by 
taking more influencing factors into consideration?” and “What could LEGO have done 
differently in its relationship to the outsourcing vendor Flextronics”. We used the Case Study 
Research method to work on these questions. Doing that, we reviewed theories, which 
explained the phenomenon of outsourcing on a theoretical basis. After creating a theoretical 
framework and the database, we analyzed the case (LEGO) for parallels between the theories 
and their practical experience. Finally, we were able to drawn some conclusions to both the 
central and subsidiary questions initially posed.  
 
In summary, it can be said that LEGO did not take all aspects into consideration which the 
theories describe as being useful to make the “make-or-buy” decision and to manage the 
relationship properly.  
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GLOSSARY: 
 
Competitive Advantage – the collective factors that allow a company to do better than its 
rivals. These vary from well-established brands and cost-effective production methods to sole 
ownership of raw materials and other suppliers.(Clark, 2006) 
 
Vendor- a company or a person that sells a particular product.  
(www. dictionary.cambridge.org) 
 
Make-or-Buy Decisions- determination of whether it is more advantageous to make a 
particular item in-house, or to buy it from a supplier. (www.businessdictionary.com) 
 
Interfirm - the way, in which the companies react with each other in a market, ranging from 
total interdependence to total independence (Clark, 2006) 
 
Resources- anything that can act as an input to an economy, including capital goods, human 
resources and natural resources. Some economists limit the definition to scarce factors of 
production. (Clark, 2006) 
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1 Introduction 
 
Globalisation has made the competitive environment intensely challenging in many industries. 
This is especially true for organisations from traditional industrial nations in Western Europe 
as well as Japan and the United States, who can find themselves confronted with competitors 
from emerging economies.  These competitors from emerging markets are characterized by 
considerably better cost structures due to lower labour costs and different labour protection. 
To defend their market position companies in the traditional industrial nations are forced to 
find new ways to increase their competitive advantage. Preferred instruments to increase 
competitiveness are cost cutting and concentration on the core business. These instruments are 
highly valued both in literature and practice. More and more companies consider the 
connection of these instruments as the key to secure their entrepreneurial success. This 
development of searching for a way to reduce costs quickly resulted in an intensive 
involvement of companies in outsourcing (Souibki, 2008: 10-11) these facts made the topic of 
outsourcing really interesting for us to investigate within this project.  
 
Outsourcing has been receiving increasing attention both from academic and practitioner 
communities in the last couple of years. According to Griffiths (2001) outsourcing can briefly 
be defined as “the strategic use of outside resources to perform activities traditionally handled 
by internal staff and resources”. The outsourcing process can be defined “as the process of 
establishing and managing a contractual relationship with an external supplier for the 
provision of capacity that has previously been provided in-house.” (Momme, 2001: 5).  Also 
the fact that close to 35% (Souibki, 2008: 5) of all outsourcing projects worldwide are 
regarded as not successful or at least not as successful as expected attracted our attention.  
 
When it comes to Denmark, it can be recognized that its companies are highly motivated 
towards outsourcing. Denmark has the highest level on outsourcing volume, both nationally 
and internationally, of all of the Scandinavian countries (Danish Ministry of Business and 
Growth, 2008: p. 8). Almost 90% of large Danish companies (organizations with 500 or more 
employees) are engaged in outsourcing (Gove, Katie, 2009: p. 3-5).  The most outsourced 
functions are by far facility management and IT operations (IBID). When it comes to the 
geographical allocation of the volume being outsourced then Denmark itself is ranked the 
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highest. The next significant destination of outsourced functions is in general Europe followed 
by Asia (IBID). 
 
1.1 Problem Formulation 
When we started our research we soon realised that most of the companies in Denmark are 
not satisfied with the results achieved by their outsourcing activities so far. We refer 
especially to a survey made in 2008 by a Danish management consultancy named Trellis. This 
consultancy conducted a benchmark study including 22 Danish companies from four 
industries (Finance, IT, Manufacturing, Pharma).  In order to understand the disappointment 
of Danish companies the motivational factors have to be mentioned. The top two motivations 
are the desire to achieve cost savings and access to competencies. The willingness for access 
can be seen as the desire for knowledge-intensive resources, which only exist, to a certain 
degree within the company. The relevance for Denmark results out of the fact that there are 
not enough highly-educated, skilled employees to conduct the knowledge-intensive work that 
the companies demand for growth within the country (Gove, 2009: 3-5). The survey states 
that the principal measurement tools for outsourcing are costs. But it also states that 
companies have experienced that significant cost savings have been difficult to secure. 
Furthermore the survey showed that the access to competencies the companies hoped to find 
was rather limited (Gove, 2009: 3-5).  One famous Danish example where outsourcing was 
not as successful as predicted, is LEGO. Due to financial problems in 2004 they made several 
huge outsourcing contracts. In this project we will analyse one specific outsourcing agreement 
that LEGO made. The one with Flextronics an American company providing electronic 
manufacturing services. This outsourcing relationship between LEGO and Flextronics is of 
special interest to us because evidently something went wrong so that LEGO backsourced the 
activities from Flextronics back in-house.  
 
Therefore we are investigating on the question “How could LEGO improve the 
 Make-or-buy- decision and the relationship management when it comes to outsourcing”?    
In order to be able to answer this question this project needs to answer a couple of sub 
questions beforehand. One of these is to investigate “How could LEGO improve the 
decision-making-process to outsource by taking more influencing factors into 
consideration?” 
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In literature it is stated that serious pitfalls are often encountered when the outsourcing 
strategy is broken downward into operational level (Insinga and Werle, 2008: 58). We will 
analyse if this was a mistake which LEGO made, as well.  
Secondly we ask “What would be the consequence of planning outsourcing not only on 
expectation of short term cost savings?”. We seek to answer this question by comparing what 
LEGO did with the theoretical framework for outsourcing decisions. Finally we answer the 
question “What could have LEGO done differently within its relationship to the 
outsourcing vendor Flextronics?” 
 
At the end of this project, it is our goal to lead to a solution of how LEGO could have 
improved their outsourcing decision justified by the latest findings of both the academic and 
practice world. 
 
2 Methodology 
2.1 Philosophy of Science  
Philosophy of science includes epistemology and ontology. The latter questions what is the 
meaning of the problem of being? Our ontological assumptions about the phenomenon of 
outsourcing were formed before the process of writing this project by knowing about the 
existence of this subject. However, our understanding about outsourcing was not fully 
developed. Our ontology in relation to this topic stays in the field of social science and 
belongs to modernist approaches. Here we understand the reality of study’s object as 
constructed and defined by using theories, methods and strategies. The ontology about 
multiplicity fitted the best with the Case Study Research offered by Robert K. Yin, who 
considers his method being “comprehensive research strategy” (Yin, 2003:14). The variety of 
accessible strategies allows us to explain, describe, illustrate and explore the existing 
epistemologies in our field of study, meaning existing scientific theories and existing 
empirical studies. We are going to build our epistemology by taking into consideration 
scientific theories and a specific case. 
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2.2 Project Design  
 
 
 
Figure 1 Project Design 
 
In the project design shown above one can see that the study and its problem investigation 
belong within the scope of international outsourcing. To answer the problem formulation we 
started to investigate methods, theories and a case. We investigated these key aspects 
separately, making a linkage of the case to the method, thus the methodology became 
influenced by the problem formulation and the case. Then we continued our study using 
investigated method, theories, case by combining it and discussing it in the analysis part of the 
project. However, we consider the analytical process of the project already appearing in the 
previous parts, before the analysis chapter. How and which specific theories we have chosen 
as well as what methods we use to answer our problem formulation will be described more in 
depth in the following sections.  
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2.3 Case Study Research 
Since the project deals with the contemporary outsourcing situation and since we have no 
control over the outsourcing process, we have chosen the method for answering our problem 
formulation, which is, as mentioned above, Case Study Research method offered by social 
scientist Robert K. Yin (2003). The case study research method is defined as a research 
strategy used to understand phenomena of organizations, groups, politics etc. (Yin, 2003:2). It 
is not only the method to answer the problem within a chosen topic but it also advises how to 
design the whole study.  
 
Designing Our Problem and Single Case Study 
We have been following Yin’s suggestions from the very beginning of this research and by 
defining our main-question we draw special attention to: how we can justify our findings? 
Will we discover something rare? Will we apply advanced theories? (Yin, 2003:17) After 
formulating our problem definition using Yin’s methodological assumptions we discovered 
our research already being mostly in the frames of single-case study design. According to 
Yin, a single case could be a representative or typical case, “Here, the objective is to capture 
the circumstances and conditions of an everyday or commonplace situation”, knowledge 
gained from these case studies is assumed to be informative about experiences of average 
organizations (Yin, 2003:41). This methodology also offers us to not to proceed directly to 
data collection phase without specifying theoretical propositions but to include the theory 
development as an essential step in doing case study (Yin, 2003:28-29). We are aware of the 
fact that doing this project we could choose between doing single-case study and multiple-
case study, however we limit this project by investigating only one organization. Yin states, 
that doing multiple- case study would be better than investigating one case. This is because 
the conclusions of single-case data analysis do not offer external generalizability to 
understand the phenomena of problem as multiple-case design does (Yin, 2003:53). Since our 
project seeks to investigate the phenomena of outsourcing itself - multiple-case study would 
be a good way of analyzing it. However, investigating more than one organization is time-
consuming, thus we have been considering ways of how to still make a significant and 
scientific project using single case method. We have decided to increase the validity of the 
project by spending time on collecting data from multiple pre-existing sources of evidence.  
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Data Collection   
We have chosen to get around the issue of possibly insignificant research using single-case 
study by using pre-existing valuable and justifiable data for making our project’s database. In 
other words, instead of collecting the data ourselves we chose to use secondary sources. Using 
the case study method we are able to deal with a variety of forms of evidence; documents, 
articles, interviews etc. (Yin, 2003:8). The multiple sources of evidence that we are going to 
collect and use for the case study’s investigation are LEGO’s annual reports, progress reports 
and company profile. The whole database will be introduced later on in the Case Study 
chapter and some of the original data, which is not easily accessible, will be placed in the 
appendix chapter.  
 
Data Analysis Method  
“Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, testing or otherwise 
recombining both qualitative and quantitative evidence to address the initial propositions of a 
study” (Yin, 2003: 109). Our analysis will be done by analyzing data of secondary sources in 
relation to our theoretical framework. To do so, we are going to use the strategy offered by 
Yin - ‘Relying on Theoretical Propositions’. This is a preferred strategy, which helps to 
follow theoretical propositions (which had caused our case study) and later on influences how 
new propositions are reflected upon. In our case we are going to draw the main propositions 
from theories and analysis and discuss them applying our collected data to their context. To 
be able to combine and discuss the theoretical propositions together with our data we need to 
use the technique of finding and matching the patterns. Therefore we decided to use ‘Simpler 
Patterns’ design, which is a part of the ‘Pattern Matching’ technique. The latter, lets us 
compare (…) an empirical based pattern with a predicted one (or with several alternative 
predictions)” (Yin, 2003:116). ‘Simpler Patterns’ is used when there are not many dependent 
or independent variables in the study and it is used to “determine the best ways of contrasting 
any differences as sharply as possible and to develop theoretically significant explanations for 
the different outcomes” (Yin, 2003:119). Moreover, we have chosen the data analysis strategy 
“Relying on theoretical propositions” and the techniques “Pattern matching” and  “Simpler 
patterns” limiting the scope of other possible logics such as “Thinking about rival 
explanations”, “Developing a case description”, “Nonequivalent dependent variables as a 
pattern”, etc. This is due to them being the most convenient methods bearing our case in 
mind.  
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To begin with, we are going to set the theoretical propositions. Secondly, discuss each 
proposition separately by matching the patterns to the theories and the data. Lastly, we will 
combine, discuss and analyze all propositions together in a relation with our problem 
formulation.  
2.4 Choosing the Theories 
As already mentioned, Yin highlights the importance of theoretical propositions and 
theoretical knowledge in the academic project. This is why we put special emphasis on the 
theoretical part of the project, which requires a method for choosing the best theories to 
answer our research problem. In this part we are going to introduce the article “Outsourcing 
Process and Theories” (2007) written by Zoran Perunović, doctoral candidate of Technical 
University of Denmark. We use his study as a method to choose theories for our project to 
explore and explain the outsourcing process. This section also includes a table of possible 
theories, showing which of them we have chosen for our project.  
 
According to Perunović the outsourcing process is a complex structure consisting of various 
activities carrying many decision-making dilemmas. Therefore, many theories have been 
discovered in literature to help academics to understand the character of those activities. 
Perunović defines the activities such as Preparation, Vendor Selection, Transition, 
Management of Relationship and Reconsideration being different phases of outsourcing, 
which he associates with theoretical explanations (Perunović, 2007:2-5). Having in mind our 
problem formulation we have been guided to look at some of the key activities belonging 
mostly in the preparation and reconsideration phase and collated it with certain theories. It 
starts with the Transaction Costs Economics which is concerning the decision-making process 
of the company. A company can take this theory into consideration when the question arises if 
they should outsource. When a company has made a decision to outsource, the Resource-
based View and the theory of the Core Competencies can give answers what a company 
should outsource and what not. The Knowledge-Based View considers thereby especially 
knowledge which can be shared. The Relational-View is complementary to the Resource-
Based View but focusses on how a company could create another competitive advantage by 
creating an outsourcing relationship.  After this, the relationship between the outsourcing user 
and vendor has to be created and controlled. The Principal-Agent-Theory gives a theoretical 
approach how to this efficiently from the perspective of the outsourcing user.  
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Continuing to define the main theories we have to consider these theories in the case of our 
project. Thus we have used this study’s links between theories and outsourcing and also 
included key points from our collected database, which is LEGO. To better understand these 
links we made table. By using Perunovićs study we describe below how the theories relate to 
outsourcing and we show which theories apply to the context of this case study.  
 
Theory Relevance for Outsourcing LEGO 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
Every business transaction causes costs. The more 
complex and the less frequent, the greater the 
costs for governance – what is the optimal 
governance model for the specific task: market or 
hierarchy? 
Delivers a framework for the 
outsourcing decision with a focus 
on short term cost savings.  
x 
Resource-Based View (RBV) 
The firm is not defined by its products but by its 
resources. They are the basis for competitive 
advantage.  
 
Tool of strategic management for 
an appropriate use of resources. 
x 
Core Competencies (CC) 
To gain competitive advantage you need to know 
about your core competencies and use them 
appropriately.  
 
Delivers a framework for decision 
making in a more long-term 
perspective.  
x 
Principal-Agent-Theory (PAT) 
Problems between principals and agents occur. To 
solve these expenditures are necessary.  
If principle-agent problems can 
occur the costs have to be 
calculated.  
x 
Knowledge-Based View (KBV) 
Further development of RBV. “Production Factor 
Knowledge”.  
 
Knowledge sharing is positively 
related to outsourcing success. 
- 
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Relational View 
Complementary to RBV. Relation between 
internal and external resources leads to 
competitive advantage.  
Outsourcing can be ideal to gain 
external knowledge.  
- 
Figure 2 Table of Theory & Case Match, own resource 
 (Green- to be considered Red- not to be considered) 
 
In the table above, one can see accessible theories within the context of our chosen LEGO 
case. We have decided to use the theories for our theoretical framework, which are colored in 
green in the table. Theories colored in red will not be considered in our project due to their 
irrelevance to our case. The project is going to be built on Transaction Cost Economics, 
Principle-Agent-Theory, Resource-Based View and Core Competency, which will be 
discussed more in detail in the following theoretical framework section.  
 
3 Theoretical Discussion 
 
In order to be able to answer to our main-question we divided the problem into sub-questions. 
For the first sub-question, we are using the theories of the Resource-based View and core 
competencies, which are closely related to each other.  We use the first two theories to 
investigate the problems faced by LEGO which appeared in the decision-making process. By 
doing this, we are focusing on the competencies which play an important role in the 
outsourcing process. For our second sub-question, we used the principle-agent-theory. With 
this theory, we are focusing on the relationship and the problems which appeared within the 
outsourcing journey of LEGO.  
3.1 Outsourcing 
Outsourcing can briefly be defined as “the strategic use of outside resources to perform 
activities traditionally handled by internal staff and resources”. The outsourcing process can 
be defined “as the process of establishing and managing a contractual relationship with an 
external supplier for the provision of capacity that has previously been provided in-house.” 
(Momme, 2001: .5).   
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The word outsourcing consists of the words out and sourcing. Sourcing here means the act of 
transferring work, responsibilities and decision rights to someone else (Power, Desouza, 
Bonifazi, 2006). As this is sometimes situated outside the boundaries of the company it is 
outside-sourcing or, in short, outsourcing.  
 
As Power, Desouza, Bonifazi, (2006) show in the Figure below, there are three components of 
outsourcing:  
 
 
Figure 3 The components of outsourcing (Source: Power, Desouza, Bonifazi, 2006) 
 
The client is the company that outsources a project. Clients can range in scope and size, it can 
be an entire organization or a unit within an organization (Power, Desouza, Bonifazi, 2006 p. 
4). In this project the client is seen as an entire organization. The vendor is the service 
provider who will take over and conduct the outsourced work (Power, Desouza, Bonifazi, 
2006 p. 4). Similar to the client a vendor can be an external organization or, more rarely, a 
subsidiary of the organization. When we talk about a vendor in this project, we mean an 
external organization. The third component, the project, is the actual work being outsourced. 
This can range from manufacturing to software development and Research & Development 
(Power, Desouza and Bonifazi, 2006).  
Outsourcing  18/60 
The outsourcing process itself consists of several phases, the preparation, the vendor 
selection, the management of the outsourcing relationship and the reconsideration phase:  
 
 
Figure 4 Phases of the Outsourcing Process (Source: Perunović, 2007) 
 
The process of outsourcing starts with the preparation phase, which consists of setting up a 
strategy, collect sourcing options, get an overview of possible vendors and thinking about the 
legal and technical aspects. In the second phase the vendor is actually selected. The 
outsourcing contract is negotiated and finalized. Assets, human resources, knowledge etc. are 
exchanged and ways of communication and escalation are defined. The third phase includes 
relationship management which includes the maintenance of the outsourcer-vendor 
relationship. Performance is measured and maybe discussed in meetings, problems are solved 
and certain topics are renegotiated. The fourth and last phase, called reconsideration takes 
place after the expiration of the contract. The outsourcing is reviewed and this may lead to a 
change in vendor or backsourcing the activities (Perunović, 2007).  
 
The main reason why companies outsource is to reduce costs. The client company does not 
need to invest in expensive equipment, staff or IT-systems but buys it in the needed quantity 
from the vendor. Additionally outsourcing allows a company to focus on the core business 
instead of dealing with a large number of businesses. It is not possible to be an expert at 
everything and therefore companies cherish the possibility to gain additional knowledge 
through outsourcing. All these factors together can result in increased incomes for the 
outsourcing company (Ngwenyama and Bryson, 1999) 
 
Outsourcing is difference to vertical integration since former in-house produced goods or 
services are now supplied by a vendor. This can happen in various constellations.  
 
As mentioned before an advantage of outsourcing can be increased income due to a reduction 
of costs. If the company is able to reduce production costs through outsourcing, it can achieve 
a better margin on their products. This allows good prices to be offered on the market and can 
lead to an increase in sales. But this economic growth has its price. The outsourcing company 
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can also benefit from the vendor’s knowledge and ideas (Rothery and Robertson, 1995). On 
the other hand there are disadvantages or challenges. By outsourcing, especially to countries 
other than the client´s home country, an increase in unemployment can result. Besides the fact 
that greater unemployed results in less purchasing power the client may also suffer from a bad 
reputation. In addition to these external factors, outsourcing can also threaten the company 
from the inside via loss of control (over the manufacturing process e.g.) or loss of data and 
knowledge. Furthermore the partner selection, its qualification and the monitoring costs can 
be challenging. If there are many outsourcing arrangements in a company it can become 
difficult to manage them properly (Rothery and Robertson, 1995). 
 
It can be said, that outsourcing can build competitive advantage but it does not necessarily has 
to. Therefore the outsourcing decision has to be made carefully and on a strategic 
management level.  
3.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
A transaction takes place, when a good or a service is given from one entity to another, e.g. 
when a product is placed on the market. When a transaction occurs, costs arise: transaction 
costs. Arrow defines transaction costs as costs of running the economic system (Arrow, 
1969:48). Williamson extended this definition by stating that transaction costs are the ex ante 
costs as costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an agreement but also ex post costs 
like maladaption costs,  haggling costs, set up and running costs (governance costs) and 
bonding costs (Williamson, 1985:20). Following these definitions transaction costs arise 
whenever a company is acting on the market. For that reason transaction costs are a 
significant part of every product, which should be considered by the company although they 
are often difficult to quantify (Williamson, 1985). In this project we will not analyse 
transaction costs mathematically but investigate the impact of different organizational 
relations on those costs.  
 
The idea that economic action is based on transactions was first mentioned by John R. 
Commons. According to Commons the smallest entity to analyse in the market is the 
transaction between participants (Commons, 1996). Ronald Coase developed this approach 
further by stating that there are “costs of making each contract” and was rewarded with the 
Nobel Prize for this theory (Coase, 1937). During the 1970´s the transaction cost approach 
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became widely known through the work of Oliver E. Williamson. He introduced the term 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE).  
 
As transaction costs can be significant, they have an impact on every decision in the company. 
Wrong decisions can lead to marginal costs and therefore it is advisable to build decisions on 
the right assumptions and analysis. Transaction cost economics seeks to explain, how 
transactions can be conducted more or less efficiently in a certain organizational surrounding. 
In this project we will look at the meaning of TCE for strategic management decisions, more 
specifically the make-or-buy decision.  As the decision whether to outsource or not has huge 
impact on the whole company this is a decision which should be made with great care, taking 
the different transaction costs into consideration.  
 
Williamson’s theory of TCE is based on the assumption that every transaction occurs in a 
certain organizational setting and that this setting has influence on the transaction costs. The 
basis assertion of Williamsons TCE is that there are two possible organizational settings: 
markets and hierarchies. They are alternative instruments for completing a set of transactions 
(Williamson 1975: 8).  Therefore they are called “governance mechanisms”. Market forms of 
governance rely on prices, competition and contracts to keep all parties of an exchange 
informed of their rights and responsibilities (Barney and Hesterley, 2006:113) whereas 
hierarchies are governance structures in the firm. For the outsourcing decision it is important 
to find out, which set of governance (market or hierarchy) is more efficient in the specific 
situation. To make the right make-or.-buy decision the company needs to figure out if internal 
(hierarchy) or external (market) forms of governance lead to the lowest transaction costs. To 
calculate the transaction costs of these two governance models in question it is important to 
know how transaction costs arise (Cox, 1996).  
 
In our project, we will analyse the impact of Williamson’s assumptions of opportunism, 
bounded rationality and uncertainty. The assumption of small numbers is not relevant for our 
analysis of the outsourcing at LEGO as only large numbers of transactions were being 
outsourced.  
 
The term bounded rationality includes both, physical limits and language problems. Even 
before Williamsons introduced the term bounded rationality in 1975 Simon described that the 
capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small 
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compared with the size of problems whose solution is required for objectively rational 
behaviour (Simon, 1957: 198). Physical limits in this sense can be lack of knowledge and the 
disability of human beings to handle, use and express information without faults. Therefore 
the people’s ability to deal with information is limited. Language problems mean the different 
use of language among the parties of transactions. Language problems refer to the fact that 
different vocabulary is used to express the same things. People are often not able to describe 
their ways of doing something in a way that another person is able to properly understand 
(Williamson, 1975). For these reasons acting in transactions is only limited rational. Due to 
the limited knowledge and language problems it is not possible to foresee all possible 
outcomes of transactions. A certain level of uncertainty will constantly remain. This builds an 
environment of uncertainty. The challenges are so numerous, that they cannot all be 
considered (Williamson, 1975: 24). Hence, decisions have to be made under uncertainty. This 
is a renunciation from the homo economicus (Simon, 1947) which was supposed to act under 
total rationality. As decisions are made with uncertainty firms do not necessarily search for 
the best alternative, but go for the one predicted as possible, easy and cheap (Williamson, 
1990). Nonetheless the consideration of these limits can be very costly or even impossible.  
 
Williamson’s assumption of opportunism extends the traditional economic approach to 
economic behaviour. According to the traditional economic theories, strategic behaviour is 
based on self interest. Williamson adds the actors guile to his self interest.  Guile here can 
mean lying, stealing and cheating (Williamson, 1985:47) and shrinking. This means that, 
intentionally or unintentionally information is misunderstood, manipulated or misrepresented 
and influenced the transaction. It can be described as lack of honesty (Williamson, 1975:9). 
Because of opportunism both parties of a contract are interested in achieving the best position 
in the transaction. Therefore they try to negotiate the most favourable terms in the contract 
(Williamson, 1975: 27). Due to the presence of opportunism firms have to defend themselves 
against it by creating safeguards so they will not be victimized by others (Hesterly, 2006:114). 
Furthermore the size of the transaction has an impact on the opportunistic behaviour. Small 
numbers serve as a catalyser and enforce the problems of opportunism. Thus, not every 
transaction is characterized by opportunism but without it transactions could be made on 
promises without the need of contracts. In contrast to opportunism the system’s interest is to 
avoid both the bargaining costs and the indirect costs which are generated in the process 
(Williamson, 1975: 27). When it comes to outsourcing the problems of small numbers can 
usually be disregarded as we assume that only large numbers are outsourced.  
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Figure 5 The organizational failures framework (Source: Williamson, 1975) 
 
As we can see in Williamsons organizational failure framework bounded rationality, 
uncertainty, opportunism and small numbers lead to information impactedness.  Information 
Impactedness exists when underlying circumstances relevant to the transaction (…) are 
known to one ore more parties but cannot be discerned by or displayed for others without cost 
(Williamson, 1975: 31). Hence, costs for balancing the information impactedness arise.  
 
Barney & Hesterly (2006) e.g. regard more factors as being challenging for transactions: 
uncertainty and transaction specific investment. He argues that the problem of bounded 
rationality can arise under uncertainty. If there was total certainty there would be no bounded 
rationality due to unpredictable future events. Transactions would then be easy to manage. 
Above a certain level of uncertainty it will not be possible to rely on contractual agreements 
in order to govern the partner-firm. The higher the level of uncertainty, the more likely there 
will be additional measures of governance and control. To defend the firm from this threat 
additional governance will be chosen despite of its costs (Barney and Hesterly 2006: 115). 
The buyer must establish a governance arrangement with the supplier in order to ensure the 
delivery of a product or service at a specified price, quantity and quality. The disadvantage of 
these additional measures of governance and control is that they are very costly. These 
additional costs have to be taken into consideration when making the make-or-buy decision. It 
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has to be analysed what is higher, the threat of opportunism or the costs for control and 
governance. The assumption is that companies will be motivated primarily by efficiency 
considerations and choose the less costly of the options (McIvor, 2005:43). Transaction 
specific investments are investments in physical and human resources that are specialized to a 
certain task. A term used similarly is asset specifity. Learning a language, for instance, is a 
very asset-unspecific investment whereas teaching workers to use a highly complex 
production machine is an asset-specific investment which is closely related to the one special 
product which is made with this machine.  Williamson (1975) argues that if there is a high 
level of uncertainty and asset specifity, then hierarchical forms of governance are the best 
choice. This means that the process is most efficiently conducted in-house.  
 
Following this argument, market forms of governance can come to their limit here as the 
governance costs become too high. Using hierarchical forms of governance can be an 
alternative (Williamson, 1975) meaning that the transaction is conducted more efficiently 
within the firm.  
 
In summary one can say that the more specific and uncertain and the less frequent a 
transaction is, the more costly it is to govern. When evaluating the rationality of a transaction 
it is therefore necessary to consider the transaction costs. The company should outsource 
activities only if to carry them out internally would require excessive investment to get the 
lowest unit costs (McIvor, 2005:42). Outsourcing a core competence for instance, is often not 
very efficient because it is very specific and therefore related to high transaction costs.  
 
The goal of a company will always be maximizing profit by minimizing costs. This will 
probably be the basis of every make-or-buy decision. Therefore the transaction costs have an 
impact on the outsourcing decision. It depends on the level of bounded rationality, 
opportunism and uncertainty as to how high the transaction costs in the case of outsourcing 
are going to be. Cos states that the key decision is to asses the relative efficiency of alternative 
means of contracting among potential suppliers of goods and services, both internal and 
external (Cos, 1996).  
 
If companies outsource, the boundaries of the company are displaced. Hence there is always a 
loss of control when certain parts of the company are outsourced. The outsourced activities no 
longer happen within the boundaries of the outsourcing company and are therefore difficult to 
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monitor. If the activities are outside the control mechanism of the outsourcing company the 
risk of shirking and opportunism are enforced. Shrinking here means that the vendor is 
underperforming meaning for instance that the products are not delivered at the right time, in 
the right quantity or to the right quality. Opportunism can mean that the vendor demands 
higher prices than the market prices. To reduce these risks of shrinking and opportunism the 
outsourcing company has to invest in monitoring and coordination mechanisms (Ngwenyama, 
1999).  
 
TCE aspects are relevant in the precontractual phase of the outsourcing process. The TCE 
theory can be applied to long term contracts and cooperation as it is a useful approach to study 
these forms of alliances. TCE provides a good decision making tool to support organizations 
in the make-or-buy decision. Williamson states that every make-or-buy decision reduces to 
ascertaining whether the transaction should be mediated by an interfirm or by an intrafirm 
contract (Williamson, 2008). Interfirm in this context means mediation by the market (buy) 
whereas intrafirm means mediation by hierarchy (make).  
 
Furthermore TCE helps to prepare for outsourcing arrangements as it gives supporting 
information about the contents of the outsourcing agreement. The governance features of the 
theory influenced the fact that it has been applied in studying the managing relationship phase 
whilst the concept of switching costs made the theory applicable in the reconsideration phase 
(Perunović, 2007). Together with the core competencies approach TCE can help to develop a 
general model of outsourcing decisions. Combining these two approaches means bringing 
together operative cost aspects and long term strategies (Arnold, 2000).  
 
One can critique, that TCE relies on a single transaction as the unit of research. It focuses on 
cost minimization. We think that cost reduction should not be the only goal in outsourcing 
agreements. Additionally it is rather static and therefore not efficient in today’s dynamic 
business environments. Furthermore the TCE is inclined to assume a rather static world where 
there are orderly changes and dynamic capabilities are valueless. However as external shocks 
have become the norm because of changes in demand or technology the importance of 
dynamic capabilities is amplified (Carroll and Teece, 1996:77).  
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3.3 Resource-based View of the firm 
The Resource-based View explains the organization not as its activity in the market (Collis, 
1991:50) but as a unique bundle of assets and resources. When the company combines these 
resources in a distinctive way, it can create a competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993) Barney 
(1991) said that a resource which is seen as a source of a competitive advantage must meet a 
number of criteria, including value, rarity, imitability and organization. A resource is seen as 
valuable if it allows the organization to exploit opportunities that counter threats in their 
environment. Rarity is related to the number of competitors who also own this valuable 
resource. When a significant number of competitors own this valuable resource then it is 
rather unlikely that this resource is a source of a competitive advantage. The criterion 
imitability refers to the degree of difficulty with which a resource could be copied by 
competitors. According to Barney, the company must be also organized to exploit its resource 
so the criterion includes reporting structure, management control system, etc. (Barney, 1991).   
More important is that the theorists who support the RBV argue that resources can be 
exploited by means of contract. This perspective leads to a theoretical framework that helps 
organizations to decide in the decision-making process which activities to outsource and 
which to do in-house. This perspective is also leading to the core competencies approach, 
explained later in this work. It suggests that an organization should invest in those activities 
which they are best in and outsource the rest, since these activities are providing growth 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). These authors also point out that a firm can achieve an improved 
performance by focusing on these core competencies because the short-term success are only 
a result of the price and characteristics whereas the long-term success results out of the stem 
from the organization’s collective learning. This means that a company has to understand its 
core competencies in a strategic way before making an outsourcing decision (Prahalad and 
Hamel, 1990) 
3.3.1 Core Competencies 
Looking at the insight of the firm via the Resource-based View brings us to the sub-theory of 
core competencies as another tool of strategic management. The Resource-based View looks 
at the resources a firm has whereas the core competencies theory gives an explanation of how 
to identify core knowledge and technologies and how to use these resources in a way such 
that they lead to a competitive advantage.  
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A very simple definition of the term core competence was introduced by Oates who said that 
core competencies are `central things that organizations do well” (1998).  A more detailed 
definition is delivered by Prahalad and Hamel who state that core competence is the collective 
learning in the organization, especially how to co-ordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1994:224). Following this 
argument, core competencies can be both, technological and/or human.  
 
Following this definition it is not only necessary to have core competencies but also to 
manage them in a proper way. For an efficient use of core competencies it is important what 
the specific core competencies of the company are, how they can be established, improved or 
defended. When companies are asked to sum up their core competencies huge lists emerge but 
having a closer look, it turns out that not all of the competencies are core competencies.   
According to several researchers (Prahalad, 1994, Drejer, 2002) a company can deal with only 
five to six core competencies. Thus, every manager sees his business unit as central and 
maintaining core competencies. Therefore it is important, to separate the company’s real core 
competencies from noncore competencies without disturbance or political intracompany 
quarrel. Afterwards it is important to agree on the determined core competencies. The goal of 
the process is to develop a wide and deep understanding of the skills that currently underpin 
the firms’ success (Prahalad and Hamel 1994:226).  
 
Figure 6 The Core Competence Grid (Source: Drejer, A. 2002) 
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As explained in Drejers (2002) grid core competencies can be separated into different types:  
product-based competencies, process-based competencies and administration-based 
competencies. They can be firm specific or belonging to a public domain. They can be rather 
simple or complex.  
 
Firm-specific core competencies are, according to many authors, the major source of 
competitive advantage (Drejer, 2002:72). For that reason and because we are analyzing the 
company from the insight, we will not consider the public domain in the following 
description.  
 
A product-based competency is related to the manufacturing of a product, for instance a 
patented product technology. Firm specific product-based competency can also be human-
based core competency meaning knowledge of manufacturing and special skills. Another 
product-based competency may be the company’s reputation or the brand name.  Process-
based competencies are for special technologies that are firm specific, which can again be 
patents or knowledge. Administration-based competencies can for instance include an 
internally created management information system which can not or at least not easily be 
adapted by other firms. These competencies mentioned by Drejer (2002) are all tangible 
assets which play an important role also in the Resource-Based View of the firm.  
 
To identify the core competencies among the company’s competencies three questions should 
be asked: 1) is the competency a significant source of competitive advantage? 2) Does it 
transcend to a single business? 3) Is it hard for competitors to imitate? (Prahalad and Hamel, 
1994:283).  
 
According to Prahalad&Hamel (1994) not knowing about the company’s core competencies 
or not using them efficiently entails rather huge risks for the competitiveness and the overall 
success of the company:  
 
- Opportunities for growth may stay unnoticed 
- Managers just see the competencies of their business unit  
- Due to splitting companies into smaller business units, competencies may become 
fragmented and weakened 
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- Business unit boundaries make it difficult to cross-communicate and develop 
- Lack of core competence perspective 
- Companies only focus on their end product and fail to invest in new core 
competencies 
- Companies do not see core competencies as basis of competition 
- Companies may neglect core competencies as they see them as not useful  
 
In this chapter we will look at core competencies from an outsourcing point of view. In the 
context of outsourcing the core competencies theory provides a decision making tool for the 
make-or-buy decision. Some researchers state that it is best, to outsource core competencies 
(e.g. Drejer, 2002), others claim that core competencies should not be outsourced (Levina and 
Ross, 2003). We agree with the second group arguing that if the decision is to outsource an 
business unit for instance because a vendor can deliver the produced product or service 
cheaper, faster or with a  better quality this specific task is most likely not a core competency, 
or at least not an existing one.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Outsourcing Decision (Source: Arnold, 2000) 
 
In order to make an outsourcing decision it is important to know about the core competencies, 
regardless of whether they already exist or if it is the aim to achieve them in the future.  
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As stated in Transaction Cost Economics, products and services with the highest specificity 
are based on the company’s core competencies and should be kept inside the company.  
Whereas core competencies should be kept inside the boundaries of the firm, supporting 
competencies can easily be outsourced. Here, outsourcing can be very effective to 
complement the core competencies available in the firm. With outsourcing a company can get 
access to (non-core) competencies such as technology and knowledge. Competitive advantage 
can be achieved by combining intra-company core competencies with outside resources.  
 
3.4 Principal-Agent-Theory  
Our aim with the following theory is to analyse the problems which appeared in the 
relationship between LEGO and Flextronics and to explain them in a scientific way. To do so 
we use the Principal-Agent-Theory. When a company outsources certain functions to an 
external vendor it automatically creates a relationship (Krishna, 2004). A theoretical approach 
to explain and analyse this relationship between the company and the vendor is the Principal-
Agent-Theory (PAT) (Krishna, 2004). The Principal-Agent-Theory is often used to explain 
management problems, e.g. the relation between owner and manager (Kaluza, Dullnig, & 
Malle, 2003). More precisely, it examines the relation resulting out of the division of work 
between two parties (Eisenhardt, 1989). Jensen (1976) started to explore the survival of 
organizations by a separation of ownership and control as early as the 1960s. He argued that 
agents and principals enter into these relationships when they are expecting benefits of 
specialization (Jensen, 1976). The principal is thereby the party who initiates a relation with 
the agent. There are multiple forms of relationship. The principal-agent-relationship appears 
e.g. between the owner (principal), who assigns the manager (agent) to manage its company 
or (applied to our project) between the outsourcing user who assigns a vendor to deliver 
services (Jensen, 1976). In this relationship, agency problems occur when the two parties have 
different goals and the labour is divided. The Principal-Agent-Theory investigates these 
problems (Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal party (buyer or outsourcing user) delegates work 
to another party, the agent or provider (Jensen, 1976). The PTA makes use of the contract 
metaphor to describe the relationship between principal and agent. The contract metaphor 
states that principals and agents generate agency costs agreeing on a contract (Jensen, 1976). 
Agency costs for the principal appear by structuring, monitoring and bonding the contract to 
cover conflicting interests. These costs can also include the value of the output getting lost 
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when the costs for enforcing the contract exceed the benefit generated by the relationship 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
The PTA underlies a number of assumptions which characterize the relationship between the 
vendor (principal) and the outsourcing user (agent): 
 
1. Both, principal and agent have rational behaviour and rational expectations. 
2. The behaviour of the agent and the result of their performance affect the success and 
profit of the principal. 
3. The agent gets discretionary freedom due to incomplete and asymmetric information 
which leads to uncertainty (the principal cannot rely on the agent being loyal) and 
exposes the principal to problematic disadvantages, since they cannot control the 
agent.  
4. Different interests exist because the agent shows opportunistic behaviour to maximize 
its own profit, even when it is in contradiction to the principal’s interest (Müller, 
1995). 
It becomes an agency problem within the relationship when the two parties have different 
goals or if it is hard or too expensive to measure what the agent is actually doing as shown in 
the graphic. The area of conflict results out of goal and information asymmetries between the 
principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
 
Figure 8 Area of conflicts in outsourcing arrangements (Source: Akerlof, 1970) 
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These assumptions create three specific characteristics in the relationship between the 
outsourcing user and vendor. It is assumed, that the agent acts either differently as agreed with 
the vendor (hidden intentions), i.e. it does not state its real qualifications (hidden 
characteristics) or holds off other information (hidden information) (Dietl, 2003). These 
aspects lead to three basic types of coordination and motivation problems which will be 
explained in the following section. In addition, for each of the mentioned problems practical 
approaches are given (Wenger and Terberger, 1988). These approaches will be used in the 
analysis part to show how LEGO could have designed the relationship to Flextronics 
differently and weakened the impact of the agent by aligning the conflicting interests and by 
limiting the freedom of the agent through ‘disciplining’ (Bea and Göbel, 1999). 
 
The first problem resulting from the characteristics of the agent is called adverse selection. 
Before the interaction and relationship starts between outsourcing user and vendor, the 
principal faces difficulties to judge fully the agent’s qualities which they indicate regarding 
productivity, soft skills, education, and capabilities (called hidden characteristics) (Ebers and 
Gotsch 1999). Furthermore, the outsourcing user cannot be sure of the vendor’s plans, e.g. if 
and how the agent wants to maximize his own profit (hidden intentions). This leads to the 
principal´s uncertainty regarding the agent´s quality. The principal faces the risk of paying a 
higher price for the service than the actual real market value and is put in a disadvantaged 
situation since the principal is confronted with a pool of bidders with often insufficient 
qualifications (Akerlof, 1970) Also, the principal cannot easily judge and distinguish because 
(as said in the beginning) the agent possesses private or hidden information. The following 
methods mention ways to minimize the risk of selecting an underperforming vendor:  
 
Verification by Independent Authorities 
A company can reduce uncertainty remarkably by taking the consulting of market research 
firms or other independent institutions into consideration. They collect information about the 
track record of firms and arrange rankings and evaluations.  Nevertheless, these rankings and 
evaluations of possible suppliers are only valuable when they have been collected 
independently and all of the reviews are following the same methodology (Picot, 2003). 
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Screening and Self-Selection 
It is costly for an outsourcing user to test its own service reliably after choosing a supplier. A 
screening mechanism could be introduced. This mechanism is supposed to cut work or 
contract into small work packages and test these work packages on a contractor individually.  
In this way the output can be evaluated more easily and with less cost compared to evaluating 
the whole process ex post (Müller, 1995). After evaluating, the contract can be either 
prolonged or quitted. But it has to be criticized that this mechanism only works under certain 
circumstances. First of all, the quality of the output can be judged (through comparing etc.). It 
is also important that the quality of the output is not dependent on unidentifiable external 
factors or that the principal can at least differentiate which of the results can be accounted to 
the agent and what must be attributed to external factors. Furthermore the costs of choosing 
and testing a new agent need to be lower than continuing with the first agent who already 
proved that they deliver low-quality. Indeed, the risk in choosing a new agent who also 
delivers low-quality is omnipresent (Picot, 2003). 
 
Self-Selection Mechanism 
A more complex idea is presented by the self-selection mechanism. The less informed 
principal requires a pricing scheme of the prospective agent. This forces him to release true 
information about their respective quality. For instance, in the pre-contractual phase the price 
could be below the market level. In the case where the evaluation delivered a positive result, 
the price could be increased after signing the contract. This can minimize the principal’s risk 
ex ante. Of course, this mechanism only works when the quality of the output depends 
directly and mainly on the work of the agent and if the output can be evaluated properly 
against detailed contractually agreed criteria (Wegner and Terberger, 1998). 
 
The second problem is called Moral Hazard. When the outsourcing user has chosen an agent, 
they are only able to control the activities undertaken by the agent incompletely or with 
positive information about costs (Bea and Göbel, 1999). Moral Hazard also appears when the 
principal is able to monitor the activities properly, but has limited ability to make judgements 
about them. This results out of the information advantage of the agent about the quantity and 
quality of input and output (hidden information). The vendor could take advantage of the 
outsourcing user, e.g. through unnecessarily high budgets, reduced effort, etc. (Picot, 2003). A 
way of minimizing the risk of moral hazard appearing after the contract has been made is 
mentioned below:  
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Incentive-compatible Contracts  
Incentive-compatible contracts are an instrument used to align the different interests and goals 
of outsourcing user and agent and homogenize them (Wenger and Terberger, 1988). 
Therefore, it is suggested to introduce an incentive system. One possible way of doing this is 
to correlate the agent’s payoff to the outsourcing user´s profit. In other words, this means to 
make the agent’s profit a function of the principal’s success. Of course, the chosen factors 
have to correlate to each other positively. Then, the agent benefits the most when following 
the interests of the principal (Wenger and Terberger, 1988). In practice, this is normally done 
through giving bonuses if the quality delivered exceeds a given level or if the quantity 
delivered resulted out of an excellent flexibility of the vendor. This can occur for instance if 
the demand of the principal fluctuates. It has to be criticized that in practice it is rather 
challenging to find an indicator which can display these dimensions reliably (Wegner and 
Terberger, 1988). 
 
So far we have only discussed the situations before and during the outsourcing contract. But 
what if the outsourcing user realizes afterwards that the agent maximizes its own profit 
instead of following the goals of the outsourcing user? Even in this situation, it could be more 
optimal for the outsourcing user to stay with the agent because of irreversible investments 
(‘sunk costs’) (Arrow, 1974). Due to the fact that these investments will not be refunded, it 
could be more costly if a new agent is chosen. This could have been calculated by the agent 
beforehand, which refers to hidden intentions they may have had (Bea Göbel, 1999). One way 
of minimizing the risk of moral hazard appearing after the contract has been made is 
mentioned below. Mostly, implicit knowledge, because of a missing documentation, leads to a 
hold-up. Some mechanisms of avoiding such a situation of dependency are described in the 
following (Arrow, 1974). 
 
Avoiding specific Investments 
Dependence on the agent is only given, if a change of the agent would create costs which are 
so high, that the current contractor has the opportunity to increase its prices above market 
value. This means that the principal should ensure that the vendor is using standard tools and 
well-known technologies so that there are a decent number of other agents who could deliver 
the service without greater efforts. This shows the importance of a proper and sufficient 
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documentation about the production process, which the outsourcing user should require from 
the agent (Picot, 2003). 
 
In summary it can be said that the Principal-Agent-Theory is an useful way to investigate and 
explain the relationship between two organizations and why problems can appear within this 
relationship. Nevertheless, this approach has to be analyzed in detail and cannot deliver 
general answers or recommendations, since the challenges faced by two organizations are 
highly exclusive. 
4 Case Study 
 
The phenomenon of outsourcing being regarded as unsuccessful by many companies lead us 
to a specific example of LEGO’s outsourcing experience with Flextronics. We have 
formulated our main-question and sub-questions regarding LEGO, which in this project 
subsists as single case study. Using the presented methodology by Yin (2003) we will apply 
the advanced theories, which were introduced in the theoretical framework above, to this 
specific case study. This is going to be done in the analysis part. Beforehand, in this chapter, 
we will give a brief summarized introduction of our collected case study evidence. The 
original second source data, which we are going to use for our analysis can be found in the 
appendix chapter and at the homepages of LEGO (www.lego.com) and Flextronics 
(www.flextronics.com). The major parts of our database were created by documentation from 
LEGO archives and also by the scientific material relating to LEGO and its outsourcing 
relationship with Flextronics. The database contains LEGO’s annual reports, starting from 
2004 (see www.lego.com); progress reports, starting from 2006 (see www.lego.com); a 
presentation by the LEGO group on recent years development, 2010 (see appendix); an article 
of Strategy and Business journal by Oliver Keith, Rebuilding LEGO- brick by brick, 2007, a 
study of Richard Ivey School of Business by professor Torben Pedersen, LEGO Group: An 
Outsourcing Journey, 2012. In general, this chapter consist of more factual information a 
short introduction to Flextronics, LEGO’s environment, history, key figures table, present 
situation, future and present outsourcing strategy, which will be use afterwards in the analysis 
chapter.  
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Flextronics 
Flextronics is a leading multinational electronics manufacturing services provider. Founded in 
Silicon Valley in 1969 it is today located in Singapore. Flextronics has a long lasting 
experience in outsourcing as they have been the first U.S. manufacturer who formally started 
offshoring production by establishing a manufacturing facility in Singapore. Today 
Flextronics has 200,000 employees working in production facilities in 30 countries on 4 
continents (www.flextronics.com).  
 
 
LEGO 
Environment 
The toy sector is very dynamic. 60% of the toys produced annually are newly developed. The 
European toy market is, after the US, the second largest toy market in the world. Today 
LEGO is the third largest toy manufacturer in the world when it comes to sales. Only Mattel 
and Hasbro sell more toys than the LEGO group.  36 Billion LEGO bricks were made in 
2010, this equates to more than 1,000 per second. With the production of more than 380 
million tires in 2010 LEGO is among the largest tire maker in the world.  
 
History 
LEGO (Lege godt – play well) is a family business which was founded in 1932 when Ole 
Kirk Kristiansen began to produce wooden toys. He gave the company to his son and his 
grandson. The LEGO group is still owned by the founder’s family today. The ownership of 
Kjeld Kristiansen and his children is held by the investment company KIRKBI and the LEO 
foundation. To submit the patent application (1958) was an important step in the company’s 
history. Since then the “toy of the century” made LEGO famous.  
 
Key figures 
DKK million 2011 2007 2004 
Revenues 18,731 8,027 6,295 
EBIT 5,542 1,414 -987 
Net profit 4,160 1,028 -1,800 
Employees (FTE) 9,374 4,199 5,569 
Figure 9 Key Figures of LEGO (Source: www.lego.com) 
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The key figures table shows the bad financial situation, which LEGO suffered from in 2004. 
This financial crisis leaded to the restructuring plan in 2004. LEGO continuously improved its 
performance afterwards.  
 
Present 
Today LEGO is a modern, global enterprise whose products are sold into 130 countries. With 
a sales volume of 16,014 DKK million (LEGO, 2010), it is the third biggest toy-manufacturer 
in the world (LEGO, 2011).  
 
The LEGO motto is: “Only the best is good enough” and it has always been important for the 
company to deliver high quality products, which are durable and long living. LEGO’s key 
concepts are “systematic creativity” and “lifelong play” (Pedersen, 2012). It supports 
children’s’ creativity to built something and with 900 million potential combinations of the 
bricks there seems to be no limit for creativity and construction. Whereas children are the core 
user of the LEGO brick there is a huge fan-community among adults. But the child remains 
the centre of attention and the group´s mission is to inspire and develop the builders of 
tomorrow (Petersen, 2012). These strong values play an important role in LEGO’s decision 
making and the way business ideas are implemented. (LEGO, 2012) 
 
Whereas Research and Development takes place in Billund, Denmark, the bricks are 
manufactured in a group owned factories in Denmark, Hungary, Czech Republic and Mexico.  
These locations have been chosen due to their market-proximity. The range of product is more 
diversified than one might expect. There are approximately 4,000 different bricks multiplied 
by 58 different colours. All LEGO elements ever made are compatible no matter if they were 
bought 1960 or yesterday.  
 
LEGO was a stable and independent company but during the crisis in 2004 the environment 
became difficult and LEGO was suffering from annual losses amounting to billions of Danish 
kroner. The company had lost its way and its independence was threatened (Petersen, 2012). 
Therefore the new CEO, Jorgen Vig Knudstorp, started to get back financial stability and built 
a strategy to shape the future of the traditional company. He was the one who introduced the 
motto “only the best is good enough”. One of the restructuring elements was the optimization 
of the supply chain, one of the company´s key areas (Petersen, 2012). The goal of the 
turnaround plan was decreased costs. This should be achieved in two ways, firstly by reducing 
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the number of suppliers significantly. In 2004 LEGO had more than 11,000 suppliers, which 
is twice as much as Boeing uses to build airplanes (Keith, 2007). The second part of the plan 
was relocating the production into low cost areas. Therefore 900 out of 1,200 manufacturing 
jobs were moved from Denmark, Switzerland, Korea and the US to countries with low labour 
costs such as Czech Republic and Mexico. The new Mantra was aggressive outsourcing to 
low-cost countries (Pedersen, 2009). At the end only 20% of the manufacturing was still 
located in Billund, Denmark. This ensured that headquarter preserved a certain level of 
competencies and skills (Petersen, 2012).  The production sites in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Mexico were run by Flextronics. The measures were not only a financial 
success, but also a shift of LEGO’s organizational culture. During the restructuring phase 
LEGO went through turbulent times, from a vertically integrated business model to 
experiment with new organizational forms in various parts of the value chain (Pedersen, 
2012).  
 
As a part of the new strategy LEGO outsourced major parts of the production operations to 
Flextronics, a leading electronics manufacturer based in Singapore with a long history of 
offering services to original equipment manufacturers (Pedersen, 2010). Because of its long 
history and huge experience Flextronics was the preferred partner LEGO chose for the 
production. Thus, the outsourcing-contract was signed in 2006 only after long and hard 
negotiations (Keith, 2007). LEGO’s CEO Knudstorp stated that this contract was the last 
major step of the restructuring of the groups supply chain, which has been implemented in 
2004 (www.lego.com). It is evident, that cost savings have been the driving force for the 
outsourcing agreement with Flextronics.  
 
At the beginning of the arrangement it was a win-win-situation. LEGO had a professional 
partner and Flextronics was able to diversify its products and get knowledge about plastics for 
further market diversification. Given the size and complexity of the assignment, preliminary 
experiences with this arrangement were fairly positive. However, they also clearly 
demonstrated the challenges that face a company moving from vertical integration to a 
network constellation (Pedersen, 2012). Nonetheless LEGO had to experience, that the 
outsourcing to Flextronics included some challenges. It was difficult to transfer production 
knowledge from LEGO to Flextronics. Whereas LEGO’s workers knew that 60% of the 
production took place in the second half of the year, Flextronics was used to a more stable and 
predictable environment. Therefore, it was difficult to conduct the process effectively, 
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document the production and utilize capacities. Furthermore, trust and misconceptions lead to 
problems. It was problematic for LEGO to coordinate and control the outsourcing partner. 
Though there had been various forecasts the collaboration did not fulfil the initial expectations 
(Pedersen, 2010).  
 
When Flextronics decided to move a production facility from Czech Republic to Asia LEGO 
reconsidered his outsourcing decision in context of the corporate strategy. Finally LEGO 
came to the conclusion, that the proximity to the markets is an important factor and therefore 
terminated the contract with Flextronics. This was in 2008. LEGO realized that it was more 
optimal to produce in-house. Even though LEGO had chosen Flextronics as their favourite 
manufacturer they had to acknowledge that there had been some unexpected challenges. 
LEGO’s CEO had to admit that they were not satisfied with the effectiveness in the 
outsourced facilities. It took more time and money to educate people than they had expected 
(Pedersen, 2010). The decision to insource the brick production again showed that LEGO 
became aware of the fact that the bricks are strategic asset and that outsourcing of these 
activities did not constitute the most appropriate setup (Pedersen, 2012).  
 
After the successful turnaround LEGO is today working on a stable basis. The last financial 
results (2011) attest a rather good financial constitution. Due to Knudstorp the recipe for 
LEGO’s success lies in the successful change to more in-house production, combined with 
strong sales increases. The backsourcing from Flextronics played an inevitable part in 
achieving this (Pedersen, 2010).  
 
Today, the LEGO group is divided into 4 main areas: Markets and Products (M&P), 
Community, Education and Direct (CED), Corporate Centre (CC), Global Supply Chain 
(GSC).   
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Figure 10 LEGOs organizational structure (Source: Pedersen, 2012 
 
Future  
Lego’s aim is to grow further. Expanding markets are especially Eastern Europe and the USA. 
Furthermore LEGO expects a growing demand for its bricks in China, Mexico, Brazil and 
India. LEGO plans to develop and invest in these emerging markets. Additional growth, also 
in the existing markets, is expected by expansion in creation of educational materials and 
digital platforms.  
 
LEGO expects a growth of 3-7% p.a. and it aims to maintain high profit levels (Pedersen, 
2012). LEGO’s plan is to meet this expectation by focusing on the core product in 
combination with the introduction of a manageable number of innovations.  
 
Lego’s present outsourcing strategy  
Whereas the production was insourced again, operations for example are still successfully 
outsourced to DHL. Thus, the management realized that there are four criteria for successful 
global production: 1. It is easy to move technology – it is more difficult to build 
competencies, 2. A clear plan for training and education should be present, 3. There should be 
local leaders who know the working culture in the country and 4. There should be a clear key 
figure structure which ensures actual benchmarks/KPI between the factories (Pedersen, 2010).  
Due to the bad experience with Flextronics, LEGO created an outsourcing strategy for future 
outsourcing decisions. According to this strategy, they will not outsource their core 
competencies even though there might be high savings. This is shown in the figure below:   
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Figure 11 Outsourcing Requirements (Source: LEGO slides, The LEGO Story, 2009) 
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5 Analysis 
Out first sub-question is to ask: How could LEGO improve the decision-making-process to 
outsource by taking more influencing factors into consideration? To answer this question 
we analyse the case according to the theories of TCE and Core Competencies.  
 
LEGO had been suffering from a financial crisis. In four out of seven years from 1998 until 
2004 the company made negative EBIT (LEGO annual reports). For the first time in its 70 
year history LEGO was close to full bankruptcy. Due to the bad financial situation the senior 
management was searching for ways out of the crisis. What they regarded as the silver bullet 
was extensive outsourcing.  Therefore they turned their old strategy of high-cost but high-
quality upside down.  
 
We already mentioned in the previous paragraph that LEGO decided to outsource major parts 
of its production to Flextronics. The main reason for this was that LEGO expected rapid cost 
cutting advantages (LEGO annual report 2004).  
 
As the goal of cost reduction was the most important one we analyse the fist phase of 
outsourcing according to the TCE. The TCE will provide an answer to the question which 
parts of organization are the most efficient. To outsource or not to outsource?  
 
According to the Transaction Costs Economics, outsourcing is a market (external) form of 
governance. Market forms of governance rely on prices, competition and contracts (Barney 
and Hesterly, 2006). There has been an outsourcing agreement between LEGO and 
Flextronics as a market form of governance. Producing the LEGO brick in the company 
owned production sides would have been the alternative. According to the TCE this situation 
of inside production provides a hierarchical form of governance. Outsourcing of specific units 
or processes is regarded as advantageous if the costs of internal governance are higher as the 
transaction costs for external governance.  
 
When LEGO outsourced the production of the LEGO brick to Flextronics in 2006 external 
transaction costs occurred. In this analysis we will take a look at this transaction costs and 
investigate on the reasons for the appearance of these costs. We seek to answer the question 
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which of these costs had been considered from LEGO in the precontractual phase and which 
were overlooked or not considered? 
 
Williamson’s reason for appearance of transaction costs are human factors such as bounded 
rationality and opportunism as well as environmental factors like small numbers and 
uncertainty (Williamson, 1975). As already explained in the theoretical part of this project we 
will not take the assumption of small numbers into consideration. In the case of the LEGO 
brick outsourcing contract with Flextronics, containing a production of more than 900 million 
bricks a year the assumption of small numbers is not relevant.  
 
The first assumption Williamson (1975) proposed is the one of bounded rationality. Bounded 
rationality contains limited knowledge as well as language problems. When LEGO 
outsourced their production to Flextronics they chose a partner which had a lot of experience 
in offering services to original equipment manufacturers but not in the handling and 
processing of plastics (Pedersen, 2010). Flextronics is a leading multinational electronics 
services provider (Flextronics.com) before the outsourcing agreement with LEGO they had no 
experience in working with plastics (Pedersen, 2010). Within the outsourcing agreement 
Flextronics seeked to gain knowledge about plastics from LEGO. LEGO has a very strong 
understanding of quality (there goal is zero returns) and the knowledge about production 
processes had to be transferred to Flextronics. Due to the fact that the LEGO production was 
based on the workers long standing experience there had been little documentation of 
production processes. Hence, LEGO had to transfer knowledge to Flextronics. As described 
by Williamson (1975) it is not possible to transfer knowledge or skills without faults. 
Flextronics lack of knowledge about plastics is a parallel to the limited knowledge within 
bounded rationality described by Williamson (1975). A second parallel to Williamson’s 
theory (1975) are the language problems. LEGOs workers spoke Danish, the few descriptions 
that did exist were in Danish and they had to be translated to the language spoken in the 
Flextronics production sites. Hence, both aspects of bounded rationality introduced by 
Williamson (1975) can be found in the relationship between LEGO and Flextronics.  
 
Shortly after outsourcing major parts of the production to Flextronics, LEGO realized, that 
they were not satisfied with Flextronics effectiveness and had to admit, that it “takes more 
time to educate people than we had expected” (Jydske Vestkysten, July 1, 2008). When 
LEGO says they needed more time, it was surely also more costly to educate the Flextronics 
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workers. This means that there were high costs for limiting the threat of bounded rationality. 
These costs are the ones mentioned by Williamson in his Transaction Cost Economics (1975). 
Referring to the LEGO statement above, LEGO had not taken these costs into consideration in 
the precontractual phase.  
 
The second assumption introduced by Williamson is opportunism. This means acting out of 
self interest including lying, stealing and cheating and shrinking (Williamson, 1985). Because 
opportunism occurs in almost every transaction written contracts have to be negotiated. Here 
both parties try to achieve the best conditions for themselves. We do not have insight into the 
outsourcing contract between LEGO and Flextronics and we do not know the service level 
agreements but it is possible to analyse the appearance of opportunism to a certain extent 
using the available secondary resources. LEGO was inexperienced with outsourcing contracts 
whereas Flextronics has been a multinational provider for many years (Pedersen, 2008). 
Flextronics war surely acting out of self interest when negotiating with LEGO. Additionally, 
when focussing on only one vendor it seems as if LEGO depended more on Flextronics than 
the other way around. This extended the threat of opportunism as described in the theory. As 
Pedersen writes Flextronics wanted to get knowledge about plastics in order to diversify their 
production and service portfolio (Pedersen, 2010). We do not know to which extent they 
pretended to have a knowledge about plastics when negotiating with LEGO but they 
succeeded in convincing LEGO of being an ideal partner though they had never worked in 
that field before. It would be too much to imply shrinking, lying or stealing but at least 
Flextronics managed to accomplish their wish to get access to LEGO’s experience in plastics. 
Due to the fact that we do not know the outsourcing contract between LEGO and Flextronics 
we are not able to investigate on how costly it was for LEGO to limit the threat of 
opportunism and if they limited it at all by including secrecy policies in the contract. What we 
know, is that LEGO found it more challenging to control and govern Flextronics than they 
expected (Pedersen, 2010).  
 
Williamson’s (1975) third assumption is the appearance of uncertainty. Due to bounded 
rationality and opportunism a surrounding level of uncertainty arises. The higher this 
uncertainty, the more likely it is that one of the companies is threatened by the other. Hence it 
becomes difficult to rely on contractual governance exclusively. LEGO had not been satisfied 
with Flextronics work and so the necessity for additional governance and control 
measurements arose (Pedersen, 2010). This was needed to achieve the expected level of 
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quality. As LEGO could not rely on Flextronics squarely the surrounding of uncertainty came 
up as described in the theory. This uncertainty resulted in high costs for governance and 
control which LEGO had not considered in the very beginning.  
 
Another influencing factor on transaction costs is asset specificity (transaction specific 
investment). Though this factor is not part of Williamson’s failure framework he introduces 
this term as a cause of transaction costs, as well (Williamson, 1975). Asset specificity means 
to which extent a product or a technique is unique and difficult to use in another context. In 
the case of LEGO the product which was outsourced was the brick. One might argue that it is 
not very complicated to produce a plastic brick and that there is not a high level of asset 
specificity. But LEGO had a very strong expectation regarding the quality of the brick. 
Therefore the brick-production had only very little tolerance for mechanical or human faults. 
In the words of Williamson the moulding can be named as an asset with high specifity. It was 
LEGOs goal to have zero returns (LEGO, 2012 (a)). During the outsourcing agreement, this 
goal could not be achieved. LEGO found out that they were more special than they thought 
they were (Pedersen, 2010).  It can be said that LEGO underestimated the asset specificity of 
its physical and moreover human resources. This led to higher transaction costs due to higher 
return rates and greater effort on controlling Flextronics´ production outcomes. This result is 
analogical to the ones described in the Transaction Cost Economics.  
 
As explained in the theoretical section, it can be argued that, the higher the degree of asset 
specificity the more difficult to outsource and the more likely that it becomes to experience 
problems with the vendor. Williamson argues that if there is a high level of uncertainty and 
asset specificity that hierarchical forms of governance are the best choice. This means that the 
process is most efficiently conducted in-house.  
 
In summary one can say that LEGO underestimated the external transaction costs. They did 
not anticipate such high spending for limiting the threat of bounded rationality, opportunism 
and uncertainty. This can be underlined by the fact, that during the period of outsourced 
production the transaction costs related to the production costs increased from 18% in 2004 
up to 23% in 2005 (Schmidt, 2009).  
 
Because the transaction cost approach puts much more emphasis on the short-term cost 
savings it is useful to combine it with a more long-term approach when analyzing the 
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outsourcing decision. Therefore we analyse the parallels between the core competency theory 
and LEGOs outsourcing decision to get more information about the things LEGO considered 
when making the outsourcing decision.   
 
Krüger and Homp (1997) argue that only goods and services which are core competences 
should be produced in-house. All other products and services can be relatively easily 
outsourced.  To answer the question whether LEGO took this into consideration when making 
the outsourcing decision we have to answer a few sub-questions: What are LEGOs core 
competencies? Does LEGO know about its core competencies? Is the activity highly specific? 
Is the activity strategically important? Is the activity a core competence, a central part of 
competitive advantage? (Arnold, 2000) 
 
When LEGO went into its financial crisis the senior management had to think about the 
strategic direction the company should focus on in the coming years. They realized that the 
product range had been too diverse and that e.g. the maintenance of amusement parks is not 
the core business of a toy maker. LEGO sold the amusement parks to the Merlin 
Entertainment group and decided to focus on the core business, the brick (LEGO, 2012 (0)). 
The production value chain consists of different stages:  
 
Figure 12 Production Value Chain (Source: Pedersen, 2010) 
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We consider the product development, the development of the moulding machines and the 
moulding of the LEGO brick itself as the company’s core competencies. The creative heart of 
LEGO are 120 designers from 19 nationalities all working in the headquarters in Billund, 
Denmark. They are highly qualified with degrees from design schools all over the world 
(LEGO, 2012 (a)). LEGO has high expectation on the design and the functionality of the end 
product that should assist children’s creativity through all ages. During the restructuring phase 
where massive outsourcing took place, LEGO kept this core competency of product 
development in-house. The senior management seemed to be aware of the fact that product 
development is a core competency and that no external vendor could do this better or more 
efficiently than LEGO itself could. As product development is not part of the outsourcing 
agreement with Flextronics we will not investigate on this core competency in this analysis. 
Instead, we are going to focus on the second core competence we identified. It is the 
manufacturing of the LEGO brick itself. The brick is produced in a huge quantity- in 2010 
more than 36 billion bricks were made which equates to 68,000 bricks a minute or 1,140 
bricks every second.  The product range contains approximately 4,000 different bricks and 
figures, plus 58 different colours (LEGO, 2012 (b)). The manufacturing process is very 
complex: first the plastic is heated to 230-310°C. The plastic consistency gets pasty and 
formable. It is injected into moulds and pressed in the right shape with a weight of 25-150 
tonnes. The cooling process takes only five to ten seconds. The most difficult thing is the size 
of the mould. They have to be accurate within five µm (=0.005mm) (LEGO.com). Due to the 
high specialization of machines and labour only 18 bricks out of a million (0,0018%) fail to 
meet LEGOs quality standard. The accuracy is so important because every brick has to fit to 
the other, no matter if it has been produced in 1958 or 2012 and independently from the 
factory it was made in (LEGO, 2012 (a)). Considering Drejer´s Core Competence grid 
LEGOs competence of moulding is a product-based firm specific competence. It is 
characterized by both, workers knowledge skills as well as highly specialised machines. Due 
to the high quality which is achieved in the production the LEGO brick has a good reputation 
as a valuable toy. This reputation is a second aspect of Drejer´s understanding of a product 
specific core competence.  
 
To test our statement that the mould of the brick can be defined as LEGOs core competency 
we ask the three questions Prahalad and Hamel (1990) suggested:  1) is the competency a 
significant source of competitive advantage? It can be stated, the high quality of the LEGO 
brick is significant for LEGO’s good reputation. The fact that every brick which was ever 
Outsourcing  47/60 
produced fits to the other is a competitive advantage of LEGO over other toy manufacturers. 
The accuracy of the production is in that way an important source of competitive advantage as 
described by Prahalad and Hamel (1990). 2) Does it transcend to a single business? 3) Is it 
hard for competitors to imitate? One might argue that many plastic producing companies 
produce moulds and that this is not hard to imitate but in the case of LEGO it seems as if the 
high accuracies of the mould and the level of perfection is very hard for competitors to 
imitate. There is no other toy manufacturer which is nearly as successful with bricks as LEGO 
is. So the third demand of the theory is fulfilled as well. In summary you can say that the 
production of the brick contains all characteristics of a core competency as described by 
Prahalad a Hamel (1990).  
 
One of the problems defined in the core competence theory is, that many companies do not 
know exactly about their core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). LEGO seems to be 
one of those companies. When outsourcing the production to Flextronics LEGO was 
confronted with higher return rates. LEGO stated that they were not happy with the quality 
Flextronics delivered (Pedersen, 2010). As described in the theoretical section, the lack of 
knowledge about the core competencies can have huge impact on the overall success of the 
company. Prahalad and Hamel (1990) list eight impacts of which three can be found when 
looking at LEGO before the outsourcing contact with Flextronics: 1.) Lack of core 
competence perspective. LEGO did not consider the brick production as a core competency 
and therefore did not include this competency in the overall strategy. Doing that, (Denhardt, 
2010) did not see core competencies as basis of competition and competitive advantage. As 
we described before the high quality of the brick LEGO was achieved through the excellent 
production process and led to a competitive advantage. 3.) LEGO freed core competencies as 
they saw them as not useful. With outsourcing the production, LEGO gave a lot of knowledge 
and skills about moulding away. LEGO dismissed more than 900 workers (LEGO, 2012 (a)), 
which means that the knowledge was gone from them once outsourcing of the production to 
Flextronics began. Flextronics, though, was able to gain knowledge about LEGOs production 
of plastics. They could use this knowledge later on to compete against LEGO. Summarizing 
these findings there are many parallels between Prahalad and Hemel’s core competence 
theory and LEGO when it comes to the knowledge about the competencies, the use of the core 
competencies and their defence.  
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Taking both approaches, Transaction Cost Economics and Core Competencies, into 
consideration a basis for the decision-making process is made. By combining the short-term 
focus of the Transaction Costs Economics and the long-term perspective of the Core 
Competencies Theory an effective decision tool can be provided.  
“What could have LEGO done differently within its relationship to the outsourcing 
vendor Flextronics?” 
 
Flextronics was highly motivated to go into cooperation with LEGO. And they seemed to be a 
perfect partner for them. Flextronics is, as mentioned previously, a leading multinational 
company, with a long history of offering services to original equipment manufacturers. With 
customers like Cisco Systems (consumer electronics products), Hewlett-Packard (inkjet 
printers and storage devices), Microsoft Corporation (computer peripherals and consumer 
electronics gaming products) and Sony-Ericsson (cellular products) (Flextronics, 2012 (a)). 
The company is focused in six core areas: automotive, computing, industrial, infrastructure, 
medical and mobile and consumer (Flextronics, 2012 (a)). In the next part, we will apply the 
instruments described to different problems LEGO faced within its outsourcing process: 
The first problem area was the adverse selection. The first instrument we described in this 
problem area was the ‘verification by independent authorities’. This instrument can be tested 
on the situation ex ante. LEGO had to choose a vendor among a bidder pool. Could they have 
improved their choice by applying the instrument suggested? The instrument stated that a 
principal could reduce its uncertainty about the agent through considering the information 
given by market researchers and other independent institutions and so reducing uncertainty 
about the vendors’ qualifications. Flextronics, as a multinational market leader, can justify its 
competencies and high reputation on many certifications. These certifications document the 
high quality of the production process, but also their corporate social responsibility. For 
instance, the company is an active member of the Electronics Industry Code of Conduct 
(Flextronics, 2012 (b)). This code outlines standards for the electronics industry to ensure safe 
working conditions, dignity and respect for employees as well as environmental responsibility 
in the production process. The company and all of its sites are also ISO 9001 certified, 
another independent certification (Flextronics, 2012 (c)). This certification is one of the 
standards issued by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
(www.businessdictionary.com) ISO 9001, a worldwide highly accepted certification standard, 
deals mainly with the fundamentals of quality management systems and how they should be 
designed. These mentioned points prove that it cannot be said that LEGO has made a 
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suboptimal decision by not considering the verification of the vendor by independent 
authorities. With this background, Flextronics appears among the bidder pool as a highly 
qualified agent with high quality standards. Nevertheless, what LEGO couldn’t know at this 
point was that Flextronics motivation was also justified in the knowledge that could be gained 
from LEGO within the production of its plastics (Pedersen, 2010). This is because Flextronics 
has, as stated, also customers who would benefit of deeper knowledge in the manufacturing of 
plastics (Microsoft, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard). In our investigation, we could not find an 
instrument which would directly exclude agents with such hidden intentions. The second 
instrument mentioned in the theory was the self-selection mechanism which states that the 
less informed principal requires a pricing scheme from the agent so this forces him to state his 
services and inputs to generate certain output. Since there is no valid data about the bidder 
pool LEGO faced in its vendor selection phase ex ante, it cannot be said if and how this could 
have changed the success of the project. Nevertheless, we wanted to state this instrument in 
order to show further ways for the principal to reduce its information disadvantage and 
uncertainty.  
The second propose mentioned within the problem area of adverse selection was the 
screening. This proposal says that the outsourcing user should cut the tasks in parts and test 
the quality delivered by the contractor with small work packages since it is less cost intensive 
when a lack of quality can be proven. Then the contract shouldn’t be prolonged. The 
transition phase of the production from LEGO to Flextronics was characterized by an extreme 
speed in which the process should be finished (Pedersen, 2010).  For instance, the whole 
process started with the aim to reduce the in-house production capacity from ~ 95% to 20%. 
LEGO was working intensively to achieve this percentage as soon as possible (Pedersen, 
2010).  Michael Denhardt, a LEGO Senior Director of Manufacturing, said that the resources 
and competences needed for the transition program were totally underestimated and the 
timeline for the project was very short for the huge amount of machines, equipment and 
moulds (Denhardt, 2010). Also, that the program and project management between LEGO 
and its vendor Flextronics did not follow clear definitions of roles and responsibilities from 
the start as well as an unstructured escalation path (internally and externally) (Denhardt, 
2010). For LEGO, the return rate of quality lacking bricks sent back by customers increased 
after the production had been outsourced which can be justified by the complexity of the 
production process. This complexity had never been relayed to Flextronics due to a lack of 
documentation by LEGO (Pedersen, 2010). 
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The screening of Flextronics ex ante would have helped LEGO in many aspects. It would also 
have been perfectly applicable because the output is not dependent on unidentifiable external 
factors. This would have allowed a reliable judgment since LEGO could have compared the 
quality with its own manufacture.  As mentioned, the underlying aim of this instrument is to 
evaluate the quality offered by the vendor before e.g. transitioning the whole manufacturing. 
If LEGO had transferred only smaller subtasks to Flextronics in order to test their ability, it 
could have recognized that the agent was not able to deliver the required quality. Moreover, 
LEGO could have recognized that Flextronics was not able to deliver the desired quality 
because of an enormous complexity of the production process which was not sufficiently 
documented due to a lack in LEGO’s knowledge management (Pedersen, 2010). Also 
undefined responsibility roles and not clearly stated escalation paths could have been 
identified and improved before the actual transition of the whole production started. It was 
stated that LEGO totally underestimated the resources needed which could also have become 
visible (Pedersen, 2010). The last findings are not even underlying aims of the theory. 
Because of this, it can be reasoned that applying this instrument not only helps to control the 
agent but also to understand the outsourcing process in other dimensions, e.g. in finding own 
weaknesses, unrealistic targets and strategic misfits.   
 
The second problem field we referred to in our theoretical framework was the moral hazard. 
The problem states that after having selected the vendor, the outsourcing user can control the 
activities undertaken by the vendor only incompletely or under increasing information costs. 
When Flextronics produced for LEGO, it was difficult for both companies to align the output 
needed in regards to both, quantity and quality (Pedersen, 2010). On the one hand, the 
business from LEGO is characterized by an extremely fluctuating demand (Pedersen, 2010). 
Flextronics on the other hand has built up a business model which needs a stable and 
predictable operating environment to be profitable, economies of scale are a key phrase 
(Denhardt, 2010). This can be seen as a goal conflict between principal and agent. Besides, 
the strategic misfit was not considered by LEGO here, they could have implemented an 
instrument mentioned in the theoretical framework to force Flextronics to be more flexible. 
We described earlier on incentive-compatible contracts. This contract is supposed to ensure 
that output meets the principal’s requirements. This would have been an approach to 
homogenize the goals of LEGO and Flextronics, since the payoff of Flextronics would be a 
function of the profit of LEGO. This could have forced Flextronics to be more flexible in its 
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production and rethinking the applicability of its business model regarding the relationship 
with LEGO. Another instrument mentioned was monitoring e.g. costs of the agent to take 
information disadvantages away. This decreases the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by 
the agent. The problem which LEGO faced was the lack of documentation. They wouldn’t 
have had the possibility to decrease the uncertainty about what Flextronics is doing because 
they did not document what they had been doing beforehand. LEGO faced a huge lack of 
knowledge management (Pedersen, 2010) and all of a sudden, the employees who had the 
knowledge where replaced by another company’s staff. This fact makes it difficult to judge 
the efficiency of the vendor’s behaviour. 
The third and last problem field of the Principal-Agent-Theory was the hold-up. This problem 
appears, when the principal realizes that an agent is maximizing its own profit instead of 
following the goals of the agent. In certain cases, it is said that it is more efficient to further 
employ the agent because of irreversible investments (‘sunk costs’). It was also said that 
mostly, implicit knowledge and a lack of documentation lead to a hold-up. An instrument to 
avoid such a situation is to avoid specific investments. Avoiding these investments also 
avoids dependence on the vendor. Actually, in this problem area it turned out very well for 
LEGO. Indeed, LEGO lost its dependence to its external partner Flextronics in the first 
instance. The investment made to outsource nearly 80% of the production was also lost and 
significant additional costs appeared by backsourcing the processes (Pedersen, 2010). But 
instead of facing dependence on Flextronics when it comes to implicit knowledge, it helped 
LEGO a lot by understanding its own processes better (Pedersen, 2010). Thomas Nielsen said 
they learned that LEGO was actually more special than they expected to be (Denhardt, 2010). 
Flextronics had valuable experience and knowledge when it comes to documentation and 
standardization of the production. Before they outsourced, LEGO had not paid that much 
attention on the documentation of the production process (Pedersen, 2010). As Thomas 
Nielsen stated it: “We have had the pleasure of being in Billund for 40 years with many loyal 
colleagues. The downside to this, however, is that you become rather lazy on the 
documentation side as everybody with many years of experience knows exactly what to do.” 
(Pedersen, 2010). For LEGO it wouldn’t have been possible to reorganize the supply chain as 
efficiently as they did, before their outsourcing journey. In this last problem area, the agent 
acted in the interest of LEGO by documenting the whole production process clearly. The 
agent did not act in contradiction to the goals of its principal.  
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6 Conclusion 
 
The main question of this project work is ”How could LEGO improve the make-or-buy 
decision and relationship management when it comes to outsourcing”. To answer this problem 
formulation we stated two sub-questions: “How could LEGO improve the decision-making-
process to outsource by taking more influencing factors into consideration?” and “What could 
have LEGO done differently within its relationship to the outsourcing vendor Flextronics”. 
We have developed the methodology to work on these questions, based on using Case Study 
Research (Yin, 2003). By doing this, we reviewed theories, which explained the phenomenon 
of outsourcing on a theoretical basis. After creating a theoretical framework and the database 
we analyzed the case (LEGO) for parallels between the theories and their practical 
experience. Finally, we are able to answer or come closer to the answer the sub-question as 
well as the main-question.  
 
How could LEGO improve the decision- making- process to outsource by taking more 
influencing factors into consideration? When LEGO decided to outsource the production to 
Flextronics it had one major goal: to overcome the financial crisis that was attacking the 
company´s independence.  Due to the fact that time mattered, LEGO decided rather quickly to 
outsource certain production processes to Flextronics. The outsourcing was part of a 
restructuring plan elaborated by the senior management. When they chose Flextronics as their 
preferred outsourcing partner they took certain things into consideration: Flextronics had a 
long experience with outsourcing arrangements as it conducts many services for other large 
companies. Therefore they have a lot of experience in standardization and documentation of 
processes. LEGO appreciated that Flextronics had experience in moving Business activities 
from side to side (Pedersen, 2010). LEGO also negotiated successfully in locking prices over 
a long period of time. Though LEGO took a lot of short-term and long-term factors into 
consideration the outsourcing arrangement with Flextronics disappointed them so that they 
terminated the contract in 2006.  
 
Applying the theories of Transaction Cost Economics and Core Competencies to the LEGO-
case we were able to analyze, that there could have been some other aspects LEGO could 
have taken into consideration when deciding to outsource to Flextronics. As stated in the 
analytical section, LEGO did not take all possible transaction costs into consideration. The 
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costs resulting out of language problems and limited knowledge were underestimated by the 
LEGO management team: “It takes more time to educate time to educate people than we had 
expected and that means that we are still more efficient in Billund” (Pedersen, 2010, 7). 
LEGO was not able to transport knowledge without fault, a parallel to bounded rationality, 
and therefore lost knowledge. In the reconsideration phase LEGO stated that “you need a 
clear plan for training and educating” (Pedersen, 2010, 9). Furthermore LEGO made the 
mistake of not putting emphasis on the language problems and cultural differences, which 
resulted in, decreased quantity and quality and loss of knowledge. Today, LEGO knows that 
there should be leaders who know the working culture in the country (Pedersen, 2010). 
Moreover, LEGO did not consider the additional costs to limit the threat of opportunism and 
uncertainty, which lead to costs of control and governance that were much higher than 
expected (Pedersen, 2010).  Finally LEGO had not been aware of its core competence, the 
mould of the brick. Not knowing that this was a core competence they sourced it out instead 
of developing and defending it. It was only in the phase of reconsideration when LEGO 
realized, that “It is easy to move technology – it takes more time to build competencies” 
(Pedersen, 2010, 9).  
 
Having these LEGO statements in mind one can say that LEGO recognized that the decision 
whether to outsource or not should not be made too hastily. They already learned from their 
bad experience with Flextronics and improved their framework for outsourcing decisions. 
Nonetheless, the phenomenon of outsourcing is constantly under development and so is the 
decision-making process. Neither will a company ever be able to take all factors into 
consideration nor are we able to deliver a complete framework for the outsourcing decision. 
But considering the short-term aspects of transaction costs and the long-term aspects of core 
competencies a quite reasonable basis for the make-or-buy decision can be established.  
 
The second sub-question we used in order to answer to our main question is: What could have 
LEGO done differently in its relationship to the outsourcing vendor Flextronics? We used the 
Principal-Agent-Theory to answer this sub-question and tested different instruments which 
could have been applied in the specific situation and showed scenarios of how this could have 
improved the outsourcing process of LEGO. For the phase of outsourcing before the contract 
has been made, we showed two instruments, which could have influenced the outsourcing 
decision. We came to the conclusion that the instrument ‘verification of the vendor’ would not 
have led to a different decision and that it cannot be said that LEGO has made a suboptimal 
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decision. Also, the hidden intentions Flextronics had by getting into cooperation with LEGO 
could not have been made visible for LEGO. The second instrument applied was called 
‘screening’. This instrument stated that the outsourcing user should cut the tasks into small 
parts and test the quality delivered by the contractor with small work packages since it is less 
cost intensive when a lack of quality can be proven. We proved that this instrument could 
have changed the outsourcing process in many ways. On the one hand, LEGO could have 
recognized that Flextronics was not able to deliver the quality and quantity LEGO expected. It 
turned out that the instrument founded on the theory is useful even beyond its actual aim. 
LEGO could have found weaknesses and unrealistic expectations in its own organization by 
applying the instrument of screening.  
 
The next instrument we applied was the `self-selection`. Hereby, the less informed principal 
requires a pricing scheme from the prospective agent. This forces them to release true 
information about their respective quality. Due to the lack of information about the bidder 
pool faced by LEGO, we couldn’t investigate this in depth. Nevertheless, we consider this 
instrument as being very important for the outsourcing user to minimize its information 
disadvantage and uncertainty. 
 
After this we showed a possibility of how LEGO could have linked its interests and goals in 
the contract by using an inventive-compatible contract. We found out that, with an incentive-
compatible contract, LEGO could have forced Flextronics to act more in the interest of LEGO 
because its payoff is dependent on LEGO’s performance. If LEGO had stated this ex ante, 
then Flextronics would have thought about adapting its business model to the business model 
of LEGO. This is especially important because Flextronics needs a stable and predictable 
operating environment to be profitable; economies of scale are a key phrase whereas the 
business of LEGO is characterized by an extremely fluctuating demand. This strategic 
mistake could have been considered by negotiation between Flextronics and LEGO, because 
Flextronics would have had a higher incentive to ensure that e.g. the necessary quantity could 
always have been delivered to LEGO. 
 
The last instrument we tested involved avoiding specific investments. It is stated that 
dependence on the agent is only given, if a change of the agent would create costs, which are 
so high, that the current contractor has the opportunity to increase its prices above market 
value. This means that the principal should ensure that the vendor is using standard tools and 
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well-known technologies so that there are a decent number of other agents who could deliver 
the service without greater efforts. We also stated that this shows the importance of proper 
and sufficient documentation about the production process, which the outsourcing user should 
require from the agent. By applying this on the LEGO case we found out that LEGO lost part 
of its independence to Flextronics, but that this in fact helped LEGO by understanding its own 
production processes better. That was because Flextronics was highly competent in 
documenting and standardizing manufacturing processes. This is interesting because the 
relationship between Flextronics and LEGO showed the typical characteristics for a hold-up 
situation. Nevertheless, this turned out for LEGO as an advantage. 
 
We can summarize that LEGO did not take all aspects in consideration, which the theories 
describe as being useful for making the make-or-buy decision and to manage the relationship 
properly. Due to limited sources we were not able to investigate on all topics that came up in 
the analytical section but nonetheless we found a lot of aspects where the make-or-buy 
decision and the relationship management can be improved. To acquire these aspects in the 
outsourcing process it takes time and resources and therefore LEGO can only improve by 
investing more into that process. Due to the fact that LEGO implemented a whole outsourcing 
strategy after cancelling the contract with Flextronics, they prove that they put more emphasis 
on outsourcing and regard it as a tool of strategic management.  
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